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Introduction
SINCE the inception of the United States foreign aid program with the
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948,1 Congress repeatedly has exhorted the ad-
ministrators of the program to utilize the authority given them to maximize
the participation of private U.S. investment. This encouragement Nwas evident,
first, in the task of rebuilding the devastated economies of Western Europe,
and, later, in the task of promoting the economic development of the less de-
veloped countries of the free world.2 In enacting the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961,3 Congress again expressed its strong preference for programs of as-
sistance developed through private channels. Section 601 (b) (4) 4 of the act
requires that "wherever appropriate [the President shall] carry out programs
of assistance through private channels . . . ." In addition, Congress gave the
agency administering the foreign aid program-now called the Agency for In-
ternational Development (AID)-a number of tools with which to promote
private investment. Among the incentives available to private U.S. investors
under the FAA of 1961 are loans, investment guaranties (i.e., insurance against
losses arising from political and certain other events) and financial assistance
in making surveys of investment opportunities.
The administrators repeatedly have responded with little more than lip service
and the most limited stimulation of private U.S. investment resources.5 Several
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Counsel, Development Loan Fund, and Agency for International Development.
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1. 62 Stat. 137 (1948).
2. See, e.g., Mutual Security Act of 1954, § 413, 68 Stat. 846 (1954), as amended, 22
U.S.C. § 1933 (Supp. III, 1962).
3. 75 Stat. 424 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (Supp. III, 1962). This bill provided for cer-
tain expansions of the foreign aid program and for reorganization of its administration.
(Hereinafter cited occasionally as FAA.)
4. 75 Stat. 438 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2351 (Supp. III, 1962).
5. This resulted in extensive criticism during the hearings on H.R. 7372, H.R. 8400,
and S. 1983, the bills which became the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 424 (1961),
22 U.S.C. § 2151 (Supp. III, 1962). See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 7372 [International De-
velopment and Security Act] and HR. 8400 [Mutual Security Act of 1961] Before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1961). (Hereinafter cited
as 1961 House Hearings.)
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factors explain the reluctance of AID and the State Department to allow U.S.
investors to enter an underdeveloped country. The first is a fear, often present
in the Government, that the investor will conduct himself in such a way as to
become unpopular with the local government or the people, thus overshadow-
ing any economic gains which may be realized by his presence. In addition, it
is sometimes noted that assistance channeled through private industry is not
nearly so effective as government-to-government assistance in inducing a for-
eign government to commit itself to actions and programs regarded by the
United States as critical to the successful use of its assistance. Finally, some
investors have suggested that agency personnel prefer to deal with foreign
governments rather than private investors, both because there is less likely to
be congressional criticism of a loan on favorable terms to a foreign government
than to a particular private investor, and because such a loan or grant increases
the importance of agency personnel. This latter assertion proceeds on the theory
that the standing of AID overseas personnel and U.S. ambassadors in the
local diplomatic community may very well be determined by the amount of aid
received by the host government. If a large portion of U.S. aid were channelled
through private firms, AID personnel would tend to have less control and their
importance would be diminished.
It may be that private investment is not appropriate in areas of short-term
economic assistance, such as surplus food relief or budget support, or even in
certain long-term programs involving basically public projects, such as roads
and dams. But the values apparently placed upon private investment by the
1948 and 1961 acts do seem sound in the area of industrial development pro-
jects. First, private companies are in a better position to supply to less de-
veloped countries not only needed capital but also socially responsible manage-
rial and entrepreneurial talent trained in modern business concepts. The United
States Government, of political necessity, must rely entirely on local adminis-
tration of capital and enterprise. Entrepreneurial talent which does exist in
the less developed countries often is handicapped by outmoded business con-
cepts and a lack of social responsibility which private American industry can
supply. Finally, foreign aid channelled through private investors is less expen-
sive to the U.S. economy because it is often more efficient than counterpart
governmental operations and because private investment abroad can eventually
return a profit to the United States.
Generally, however, no real effort has been made to enlist the aid of private
U.S. investment even in the limited area of industrial development. Moreover,
private industry itself has hesitated to make investments in less developed coun-
tries for several economic reasons,0 including lack of a large market, trained
native manpower, or adequate transportation and power facilities. They also
6. Two surveys of businessmen have been conducted. The results of one, conducted by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, have been published in Responses to Business, Q11es.
tionnaire Regarding Private Investment Abroad (1959). The other was conducted by the




fear such political factors as import-export controls and government regula-
tions having the cumulative effect of expropriation, as well as war, revolution,
and other disruptions of business resulting from instability of the governments.
Equally important, but less frequently mentioned, is the fear of the unknown.
What does a Kansas City manufacturer know about doing business in Nigeria?
He will be risking a substantial amount of capital, as well as time, effort and
prestige, in a business and legal atmosphere that is almost completely un-
familiar. Even if that atmosphere is now favorable, it might suddenly change
if he or the United States should fall out of favor with the local regime.
Many of the fears harbored by potential United States investors stem from
a strong skepticism by the foreign governments themselves about the value of
substantial private foreign investment. Many countries seem to regard such
investment simply as a new form of colonialism, or a continuation of one of
the worst manifestations of the old colonialism-exploitation of the natural and
human resources of a less developed country by foreigners for their own profit.
They fear that the net gain to the native economy will be small compared with
the resulting drain on the nation's resources. Consequently, many less developed
countries have enacted legislation which, although designed to meet under-
standable concerns, often discourages the foreign investor by its complexity
and its tendency to limit his return or increase his risks. Even those nations
which have passed legislation designed to encourage foreign investment often
have enacted simultaneous legislation having a restrictive effect. Such legisla-
tion may take the form of exchange control, restricting repatriation of capital
and earnings; restrictive tax legislation; employment restriction; restrictions
on the importation of raw materials; or expropriation powers. In addition,
foreign governments not adverse to private U.S. investment often strongly pre-
fer AID assistance rendered directly to the foreign government, rather than
assistance to private U.S. investors. This is due partly to the tendency of the
officials and agencies of most governments to support projects which they them-
selves will administer. It is due also to an ideological bias of many governments
toward the use of foreign aid resources for the public, rather than the private,
sector of the economy, perhaps on a theory that a private industrial enterprise
can always find financing more easily than can the government itself.
Thus, very little U.S. private investment has found its way into under-
developed areas to date.7 In response, the recently enacted legislation is designed
7. Total direct foreign investment up to 1958 amounted to $27.1 billion. See VHITMAN,
THE UNITED STATES INVESTMENT GUARANTY PROGRAM AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVEsTMENT
5 (1959). Of this, only $9.5 billion was in Latin America, and just $4 billion in Africa and
Asia. Of the $4 billion in, Africa and Asia, nine-tenths has gone into the extractive industries
such as petroleum and mining. See the discussion in THE MUTUAL SECURITY PnoGRAm,
FIscAL YEAR 1961: A SUMMARY PRESENTATION 117-20 (1960); MucE.S , PRomoriNG
UNITED STATES PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD 15 (1957).
Another indication of the small magnitude of U.S. investment abroad is that only 1.5%
of the total assets of U.S. corporations are currently invested outside the U.S. and Canada,
wHrrMAN, op. cit. mipra at 7, and only 0.5% of all U.S. corporations have any foreign
investment at all, MiKESELI, op. cit. supra at 23.
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to induce U.S. businessmen to invest abroad by providing for increased profits
and decreased risks. What follow are analyses of the specific inducements
offered private investors under the FAA of 1961, an identification of the more
important problems facing private investors using these inducements, and some
suggestions as to how these inducements will, or should, be administered by
AID to attain their apparent objectives.
Development Loans
The basic development tool of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is the
dollar-repayable development loan authorized by Title I of chapter 2.8 Under
this title AID ' is authorized to make dollar repayable loans to promote the
economic development of less developed friendly countries.10 Although such
loans must emphasize assistance to long-range plans and programs,11 the basic
statement of the purpose for which every development loan must be made-"to
promote the economic development of less developed friendly countries and
areas" -is very broadly worded. It appears to authorize loans made for the
development of either economic resources or related social resources. 12 Assist-
ance for military, political and economic purposes concerned with stabilization
8. 75 Stat. 426 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2161 (1961). And see Pub. L. No. 565, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess., § 101 (Aug. 1, 1962). The fiscal year 1962 appropriation for this category of
assistance was $1,112,500,000, as compared with appropriations of $816,000,000 for all other
categories of economic assistance, including $275,000,000 for the Contingency Fund, which
is also available for Title I development loans. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1962, 75 Stat. 717 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1961).
9. As agent of the President, to whom the authority is actually given.
10. Section 201(b) of Title I, 75 Stat. 426 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2161 (1961), contains
no limitations on the types of entities eligible for development loans, and § 635 (b), 75 Stat,
456 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2395 (1961), provides that such loans may be made to "any in-
dividual, corporation, or other body of persons, friendly government or government agency,
whether within or without the United States, and international organizations .... " Hence,
such loans are legally available to any organization or private enterprise, regardless of its
place of organization or the nationality of its owners.
However, the requirement that such loans promote the economic development of "friend-
ly" countries would in practice eliminate organizations organized in countries not falling
within this category. Such excluded countries would be those dominated or controlled by
the international communist movement. See H.R. REp. No. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1961). See also §§ 620(b) & 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 75 Stat. 445
(1961), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2381 (1961). Possibly also excluded pursuant to a much
publicized amendment inserted by the FAA of 1962 would be those countries any govern-
mental subdivision of which effectively expropriates property owned by a U.S. citizen or
by any corporation, partnership or association not less than 50% beneficially owned by U.S.
citizens and does not within six months of the expropriatory act "take appropriate steps"
to discharge its obligations under international lav to make equitable and speedy compen-
sation for such expropriation. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(e), 75 Stat. 439 (1961),
as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2352 (1961). However, it is arguable that a loan to a private
borrower in such a country does not constitute "assistance to the government" of such coun-
try.
11. 75 Stat. 426 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2161 (1961).




rather than developmental growth of the economy, however, is covered by other
sections of the act.' 3 Probably any loan for the construction of a new enterprise
or the expansion of an existing enterprise which will serve to create new jobs,
to increase economic productivity, or to supply goods or services which will
feed into another sector of the economy and generate increased activity there,
will satisfy this requirement.
In the making of development loans, the statute requires that the following
factors be "taken into account" :14
1. The availability of financing in whole or in part from other free-world
sources on reasonable terms;
2. The economic and technical soundness of the activity to be financed;
3. The degree to which the activity gives reasonable promise of contributing
to the development of economic resources or to the increase of productive
capacities in furtherance of the purposes of economic development;
4. The consistency of the activity with, and its relationship to, other de-
velopment activities being undertaken or planned, and its contribution
to realizable long-range objectives;
5. The extent to which the recipient country is showing a responsiveness
to the vital economic, political, and social concerns of its people, and
demonstrating a clear determination to take effective self-help measures;
and
6. The possible effects of successful development upon the United States
economy, with special reference to areas of substantial labor surplus.'0
Favorable conclusions on all six factors are not required as a matter of law
to qualify a project for a loan.' Section 201, however, does require considera-
13. 75 Stat 435 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2311 (1961) (military); 75 Stat. 434 (1961), 22
U.S.C. § 2241 (1961) (political and economic stability).
14. 75 Stat. 426 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2161 (1961). The Foreign Assistance Act of 1962,
which amended certain provisions of the 1961 Act, established a separate statutory title for
development assistance to Latin America under the Alliance for Progress, including authori-
zation of appropriation of $500 million annually through fiscal year 1966 for dollar repay-
able development loans. Development loans made under the Alliance for Progress title are
subject to nearly identical criteria as govern title I development loans. The only differences
are that: (1) the third factor is omitted inasmuch as the special Latin American loans are
to be directed to the development not only of economic resources, but also of human re-
sources (schools, hospitals, etc.) ; (2) the fifth criterion is modified by inclusion of a refer-
ence to the principles of the Act of Bogota and the Charter of Punta del Este; and (3) a
new factor-the efforts made by recipient nations to repatriate capital in other countries
by their own citizens-has been added. Except for these specific modifications, the discussion
herein of development loans is applicable to development loans under the Alliance for
Progress title. It should also be noted that nothing in the special Alliance for Progress title
or elsewhere in the FAA includes or limits use of the Title I development loan funds, the
investment guaranty authorities, etc., for Latin American projects.
15. The factors numbered (1), (2), (3), and (6) are quite similar to the criteria
specified for loans by the Development Loan Fund-a predecessor agency of AID in the
field of development lending-under § 202(b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 63 Stat.
846 (1954), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 1872(b) (1961). The factors numbered (4) and (5)
are derived from general legislative injunctions to the DLF contained in § 202(b).
16. This is made clear by comparison with § 211 of the FAA, 75 Stat. 427 (1961), 22
U.S.C. § 2171 (1961), relating to the criteria for furnishing development grants and tech-
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tion of all six factors, and, accordingly, a loan applicant must keep them in
mind when considering and preparing an application for a development loan.
The first three criteria are reasonably self-explanatory. The fourth criterion
reflects a desire to use development loans to support well-conceived plans drawn
up by the recipient countries for their economic development. Under this crite-
rion, private investors should endeavor to have their projects included in for-
eign governmental plans, in order to establish a relationship to the recipient
country's development program.17 Endorsement of the priority of the project
by the host government and the United States team will be, as in the case of
Development Loan Fund applications, of critical importance.' 8
The fifth criterion-the "self-help" criterion-is the one emphasized most
strongly in the congressional presentation. 19 Inasmuch as the criterion relates
to self-help measures by the recipient country rather than by the private appli-
cant, there is little the private applicant can do to place his application in a good
posture with regard to this criterion except to inform himself on the status of
such self-help measures in the recipient country as tax reform, land reform,
educational development, and economic development planning.20 An initial check
with AID is probably the easiest way to determine whether any problem exists
with regard to this criterion in the particular country involved.
nical assistance. That section provides six criteria which the President "shall take into
account," including "the possible adverse effects upon the United States economy, with
special reference to areas of substantial labor surplus." 73 Stat. 427 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2171
(1961). It then states that:
If the President finds that assistance proposed to be furnished under ... [the De-
velopment Grant] title would have a substantially adverse effect upon the United
States economy, or a substantial segment thereof, the assistance shall not be fur-
nished.
No such prohibition appears with regard to any of the development loan, criteria in § 201,
The version of the bill originally passed by the House included the prohibition of § 211 in
§ 201 as well, but this was stricken from § 201 in conference. CoNr. REP. at 46.
17. In addressing himself to the relationship between country development plans and
private enterprise, the Hon. Frank M. Coffin, Chairman, Program Development Group of
the President's Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance, and presently Deputy Ad-
ministrator of AID, told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that:
[W]e would not consider that a sensible national program was one which did not
leave adequate scope for the private sector because we feel that the resources that
can be attracted by private domestic and foreign investment are an important part of
any country's sensible approach to its future.
1961 House Hearings at 886.
18. See 1961 House Hearings at 880.
19. See, e.g., 1961 House Hearings at 823; Hearings on S. 1983 Before the Senale
Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1961). [Hereinafter cited as
1961 Senate Hearings.]
20. It should be noted that as a matter of language, "a clear determination to take
effective self-help measures" refers to a present state of mind regarding future actions
rather than to past action or present action. However, the criterion of a "clear determilna-
tion" must mean a credible determination--one that is backed up by a showing of meaning-
ful and realistic plans for the future which, with the passage of time, must be translated




The sixth criterion is addressed to both good and bad effects on the U.S.
economy. Thus, such factors as the creation of foreign industries which vill
compete with U.S. industry in both foreign and U.S. markets and the possi-
bility of adverse effects upon the U.S. balance of payments position are con-
sidered, as well as benefits to U.S. business from requirements that loan funds
be used for procurement of U.S. goods and services.
In administering the development loan program, AID has extended the
dollar-repayable development loans to government borrowers on extremely
"soft" terms, usually an interest rate of three quarters of one per cent and a
repayment period of forty years with a grace period on principal repayment of
ten years, in accordance with the Administration's 1961 legislative presenta-
tion.21 Private borrowers have not been accorded terms as favorable as this,
however. The feeling was expressed in the Administration's 1961 presentation
to Congress that according such extremely liberal terms to some private bor-
rowers would give them an extremely unrealistic debt structure which might
give them an unfair advantage over their commercial competitors.2 The host
countries would probably be unwilling to make dollars available for private
borrowers to repay loans on terms similar to those accorded by the Develop-
ment Loan Fund 23 for loans repayable in local currency-five and three quar-
ters per cent interest and, for example, fifteen years. Accordingly, the thought
was expressed in the report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
the House version of the bill that repayment of a private loan in dollars might
be arranged by allowing a private borrower to repay the loan on DLF-type
terms in local currency to an account which the recipient country would agree
to convert into dollars over the longer period of time normally allowed for loans
by AID to the government itself.2 This is in fact the arrangement which AID
has used in almost all its loans to private borrowers.
Sections 604(a) 25 and 620(d) ,2 although outside Title I, are particularly
applicable to such loans and should be borne in mind by private applicants.
21. See H.RR REP. No. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1961); S. REP. No. 612, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1961).
22. 1961 House Hearings at 646-47; 1961 Senate Hearings at 210.
23. See note 15 supra.
24. H.R. REP. No. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1961). Malng the loan in this
fashion would appear to present at least two conceptual problems: whether a true dollar-
repayable loan within the meaning of the statute has been established; and whether use by
the government of local currency received from the private borrower until the later con-
version into dollars would be in effect a loan of the local currency to the government, which
loan may be of questionable legality. These problems should not be regarded too seriously,
however. There can be little doubt that AID could legally make the loan to the govern-
ment, to be repayable on the e-tremely soft terms with provision for relending of the funds
to the private company with repayment in local currency on DLF-type terms. In substance
this arrangement is no different from that where the loan is made directly to the private
borrower, and both arrangements should therefore be regarded as within the authority of
Title I.
25. 75 Stat 439 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2354 (Supp. III, 1962).
26. 75 Stat. 444 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (Supp. III, 1962).
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Section 60 4 (a) limits procurement with foreign aid funds to the United States
unless the President determines that offshore procurement will not result in
adverse effects to the U.S. economy outweighing the advantages of such pro-
curement. In formal actions, 27 President Kennedy determined that offshore
procurement of items for non-military programs from free-world sources would
not result in such adverse effects, except that procurement from the following
countries was to be permitted only where authorized in specific cases by the
Secretary of State: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, The Union of South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United
Kingdom. Thus far, AID development loan policy has been even more restric-
tive than that established as a minimum by the President's determination, in
that procurement has generally been limited to the United States.
Section 620 (d) prohibits the making of Title I development loans for the con-
struction or operation of any "productive enterprise" in any country if it will
compete in the United States with U.S. enterprise. The prohibition applies
only "to situations where the product of the enterprise being assisted will coin-
pete in the U.S. market directly with the product of the United States." 8 The
host country may, however, avoid the effect of this prohibition by agreeing to
establish procedures to prevent exportation to the U.S. of more than 20 per
cent of the annual production of the assisted enterprise during "the life of the
loan."
It is difficult to say just what level of lending to private enterprise-both
U.S. and foreign owned-can be expected from the development loan funds.
Past experience indicates, however, that approximately 20-25 per cent of the
loans will go to private borrowers, including privately owned intermediate
financing institutions such as development banks, and that these investors will
utilize approximately 10-15 per cent of total loan funds. 20 Although the Ad-
ministration's presentation to Congress did not highlight loans to private bor-
rowers, the "Javits amendment" to section 601 30 is a strong indication of con-
gressional desire for extensive use of the development loan funds for loans to
private borrowers. This amendment was proposed and adopted after the bill
was reported out of committee and is an addition to the provision in section
102(f) encouraging free enterprise and private participation, which is derived
from section 413 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.81 The "Javits amendment"
provides that the President, to whom the FAA of 1961 delegates the develop-
ment loan function, shall
.. wherever appropriate carry out programs of assistance through pri-
vate channels and to the extent practicable in conjunction with local
27. 26 Fed. Reg. 10543 (1961) ; 27 Fed. Reg. 7603 (1962).
28. CONF. REP. at 62 (1961).
29. This calculation is based on information supplied by AID's Office of Development
Financing and Private Enterprise.
30. So named for its proponent, Senator Jacob Javits, this section could also be char-
acterized as the "private enterprise section" of the FAA of 1961.
31. 68 Stat. 846 (1954), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 1933 (Supp. III, 1962).
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private or governmental participation, including loans under the author-
ity of section 2161 of this title to any individual, corporation, or other
body of persons3 2
Cooley Loans
The transfer of administration of the so-called Cooley loan program a from
the Export-Import Bank of Washington to AID was effected pursuant to
the FAA of 1961. 3 - Under the Cooley loan program, not more than 25 per
cent3 5 of the currencies received from the sale of surplus agricultural com-
modities is available for loans to United States firms or their affiliates for busi-
ness development and trade expansion in the nations purchasing such com-
modities, and for loans to United States or foreign firms for the establishment
of facilities for aiding the utilization, distribution, or consumption of United
States agricultural products. Each loan must be approved by the host govern-
ment, and no loan may be made for the manufacture of any products to be ex-
ported to the United States in competition with products produced in the United
States or for the manufacture or production of any commodity to be marketed
in competition with United States agricultural commodities or the products
thereof. AID has interpreted this latter requirement as meaning only substan-
tial competition. As in any standard employing the adjective "substantial," the
crucial dividing line cannot be stated precisely as a general rule but is left to
decision in specific cases. Repayment terms for Cooley loans are related to the
purpose of the financing and usually range between five and ten years. Interest
rates are set by agreement with the host country government and are approxi-
mately equivalent to local development bank rates. These range from 6-S per
cent. Loans are repayable in the currency borrowed.
The initial problem for a potential applicant is to determine whether he falls
within the category of those eligible for a loan. Inasmuch as nothing in the
legislative history of section 704 of the Foreign Assistance Act indicates any
congressional desire to change the administrative policies or practices relating
to the Cooley program, AID has tended to follow these in many respects, in-
cluding eligibility standards.36 Under the Export-Import Bank 37 standards, a
32. Section 601(b) (4), 75 Stat. 438 (1961), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2351 (Supp. III,
1962).
33. The so-called Cooley loan program is named after Representative Harold Cooley,
author of the program. Such loans are authorized by § 104(e) of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 456 (1954), as amended, 71 Stat. 345
(1957), 7 U.S.C. § 1704(e) (1958). The entire act is more familiarly known as "P.L 480:
34. FAA of 1961, § 704, 75 Stat. 463 (1961), 7 U.S.C. § 1704 (Supp. III, 1962), au-
thorizes the transfer of the Cooley loan program to "such agency as the President shall
direct." The actual transfer was accomplished by Exec. Order No. 10900, 26 Fed. Reg. 143
(1961), as amended by Exec. Order No. 10972, 26 Fed. Reg. 10469 (1961) ; Department
of State Delegation of Authority No. 104, 26 Fed. Reg. 10608 (1961).
35. Although the statutory language specified that the 25% figure is a ma-xmum, the
legislative history of the provision clearly indicates a congressional intention. that the
Cooley loan program utilize as much of the 25% as possible. See Corn,. REP. at 4.
36. The following discussion, of policies and practices relating to Cooley loans is based
on discussions with Eximbank and AID officials.
37. Hereinafter referred to as Eximbank
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U.S. "firm" is any individual who does business in the U.S., regardless of
citizenship, or any corporation, partnership, or association organized tinder the
laws of the United States or any of its states or territories. Although Exinibauk
would not have regarded substantial ownership of such a corporation by non-
US. citizens as rendering the corporation ineligible, AID has apparently not
yet determined whether to follow this position. AID has indicated, quite proper-
ly, that it would not regard as eligible a U.S. corporation organized by non-
U.S. citizens for the sole purpose of obtaining a Cooley loan.
The overall test regarding eligibility appears to have been whether the enter-
prise to be financed by the loan has a substantial U.S. flavor in terms of its
general proprietary and commercial interest, and the participation of capital
and skills of U.S. citizens. For the case of an affiliate, the Eximbank had no
strict rules, but decided each case on the basis of a number of factors, including
the degree of ownership or control by a U.S. firm, common ownership of a
U.S. firm and the applicant by a third firm, and the general commercial and
operating ties between the U.S. firm and the applicant. The general rule of
thumb followed by both Eximbank and AID has been to require at least a
20 per cent equity interest by a U.S. firm in an affiliate applicant.,, The appli-
cant also qualifies if the 20 per cent equity is held by a wholly owned foreign
subsidiary of a U.S. firm.
In addition to the general interest of an American firm in a U.S. affiliate
applicant for a Cooley loan, AID has tended to require that the U.S. firm make
a substantial commitment to the particular project being financed. This com-
mitment has usually taken the form of a guaranty of repayment by the U.S.
firm, a commitment to retain the equity interest in the applicant on the basis
of which the loan was made, or an agreement by the U.S. firm to manage the
project throughout the life of the loan. An interesting innovation in Cooley
loan administration by AID has been to offer, as part of any repayment guar-
antee from a U.S. firm affiliated with a Cooley borrower, a clause releasing
the guarantor from all or part of his obligations where the borrower's business
has been totally or partially impaired by expropriation or war damage. Such
a clause, for which AID exacts no fee, obviates any necessity that a U.S. guar-
antor might otherwise feel to purchase specific risk investment guaranties 80
against such losses.
Cooley loans are available to finance the purchase of goods and services of
host country origin, to provide working capital, and, in exceptional cases, to
refinance short-term indebtedness. Cooley loans have financed such projects as
the construction of a fiberboard plant in Greece; working capital and costs of
fixed assets for construction of a Turkish plant to manufacture rubber tires
and tread rubber; and costs, including working capital, of the expansion of the
sales and service operations of a sewing machine company in Pakistan. The
38. Hearings on S. 2996 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 53 (1962). [Hereinafter cited as 1962 Senate Hearings.]
39. See text accompanying note 6 supra for a discussion of these AID guaranties; see
also text at notes 51-81 infra.
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availability of Cooley loan funds-and the consequent ease of obtaining a Cooley
loan-varies widely from country to country. For example, sufficient Cooley
funds are available in India, where a large P.L. 480 program has been in effect
for several years, while few Cooley funds are available where the P.L. 480
program has been relatively smaller and the demand for Cooley funds by U.S.
investors has been large.
In more than four years of activity, ending September 30, 1962, the Exim-
bank and AID have authorized 188 Cooley loans in the currencies of nineteen
countries.40 Loans have ranged from several million dollars to less than $100,-
000 in foreign currency equivalent. The loan total is the equivalent of $109.8
million. The available balance of Cooley funds not yet obligated was the equiva-
lent of $124,372,828.97 on September 30, 1962.
Investment Surveys
The one new tool for stimulating private U.S. investment in the less de-
veloped countries is the authority to participate in the financing of surveys by
potential private investors of investment opportunities in the less developed
countries and areas. 41 Under the Technical Cooperation Program of the Inter-
national Cooperation Administration (ICA)-the predecessor agency of AID
in the Technical Cooperation field-financing was available for studies of the
feasibility of possible investments to be undertaken or managed by U.S. com-
panies. ICA policy, however, allowed such financing only to private organi-
zations that would not benefit directly from the study. In addition, public bid-
ding was required on feasibility study contracts with few exceptions. Accord-
ingly, there was thought to be no way to respond positively to the initiative of
a private company that would have liked to explore the feasibility of a possible
investment abroad but did not feel itself justified in spending money for the
needed study.43 The FAA of 1961 gives specific authority for the President
to assist in financing such surveys undertaken by any U.S. citizen, or any cor-
poration, partnership or other association substantially beneficially owned by
U.S. citizens." The statute does not require that the U.S. charge a fee for its
participation in the financing of an investment survey, and AID has indicated
that none will be charged. 5
Although the language of the investment survey provision itself does not
state that preference in the financing of investment surveys will be given to
operating companies, as opposed to professional survey companies, the language
of section 231(b) carries a clear implication that the authority vas created
40. Cooley loan funds are available or will be available shortly in Ceylon, Republic of
China, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Para-
guay, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic, and Vietnam.
41. 75 Stat. 432 (1961), 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-93 (Supp. III, 1962).
42. Mutual Security Act of 1954, § 307, 68 Stat. 842 (1954).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1961) ; S. REP. No. 612, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1961).
44. On interpretation of this statutory phrase, see text accompanying notes 64-63 infra.
45. AID Policy Guideline No. 1, p. 3 (1961).
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primarily to provide assistance to potential investors rather than professional
survey companies. Section 231 (b) provides that:
In the event that a person who has undertaken a survey in accordance
with ... this title determines, within a period of time to be determined
by the President, not to undertake, directly or indirectly, the investment
opportunity surveyed, such person shall turn over to the President a pro-
fessionally acceptable technical report with respect to all matters explored.
Such report shall become the property of the United States Government,
and the United States Government shall be entitled to have access to, and
obtain copies of, all underlying correspondence, memorandums [sic.],
working papers, documents, and other materials in connection with the
survey.46
The implication is supported by the legislative history. In the House Report,
for example, the statement is made that
... preference will be given, where possible, to contractors who indicate
a positive interest in undertaking the investment to be studied. Such con-
tractors may, however, employ as subcontractors, professional organiza-
tions in a manner consistent with their usual practice. 4
The provision quoted above is replete with problems to be resolved in nego-
tiations between lawyers for the Government and the private company. Al-
though the statute requires only that the report be turned over to the United
States if the surveyor makes a positive determination not to make the invest-
ment within a certain period of time, it appears likely that Congress did not
intend to allow the surveyor to keep the report if he made no decision at all
during the established time period. Probably the drafting of the provision is
faulty and the intention was to regard the surveyor's failure to make a positive
decision to invest within the prescribed time limit as a determination not to
make the investment.
Questions are then presented as to what constitutes a positive or negative
decision to make the investment. It would seem that for a surveyor to retain
the rights to his survey, the statute requires an unequivocal decision by the in-
vesting company to proceed with the investment within a specified time re-
garded by AID as reasonable. Thus, in a survey of paint manufacturing in
Pakistan by a U.S. company, AID required the surveyor to "take action to
invest in such investment opportunity" within a specified period of time. If the
surveyor takes such action to invest, he must repay to AID all funds disbursed
by it for the survey, and if he does not take such action, he must turn over the
technical report on the survey. If he changes his mind and makes the invest-
ment within two years after his delivery of the report, he must repay the AID
funds.48
46. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 231(b), 75 Stat. 432 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (b)
(Supp. III, 1962).
47. H.R. REP. No. 851, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1961).
48. See Hearings on Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963 Before a Subcomn-
mittee of. the Committee on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, at 895 (1962).
[Vol. 72: 475
PRIVATE INVESTMENT ABROAD
Other difficult problems will arise in connection with determining the extent
of financial participation in an investment survey allowed of the United States.
Section 231(a) limits such participation to "50 per centum of the total cost
of any such survey." The possibility that the investment survey authority
would be used to pay for the half of the expenses of trips of corporate execu-
tives which income tax deductions do not finance troubled at least one congress-
man.4a Hence, AID will probably be quite careful in determining allowable
costs for each survey. Problems will undoubtedly develop in determining such
things as reasonable portion of general overhead to be allocated to the survey
and expenses for survey personnel.
Another problem to be resolved relates to the scope of a survey which may
be financed. Such a survey would certainly include a study of market conditions
and pertinent government regulations. A more difficult question is the extent
to which the study might include feasibility studies of the technical adequacy
of a plant design or production process to be used. It appears that the statute
was probably intended to cover not technical matters peculiar to the nature of
a particular enterprise, but matters related to the feasibility of profitably operat-
ing such an enterprise in a particular country. Of course, the latter will often
include factors related to technical feasibility, such as the possibility of using
substitutes where conventionally used raw materials are not readily available.
Surveys of extraction opportunities are not eligible for financing under title
IV. This excludes surveys directed to ascertaining the existence, location, ex-
tent, or quality of any deposit of ore, oil, gas, or other mineral, and to deter-
mining the feasibility of undertaking operations for the mining or other ex-
traction of any such materials or for the processing of any such material to the
stage of commercial marketability. 0
For the fiscal year ended June 30, 1962, Congress appropriated $1,500,000
for the investment survey program. Inasmuch as the program was new to both
AID and the business public, AID was able to make final only one investment
survey during fiscal year 1962-the $3,500 survey (of which AID is to pay one
half) of paint manufacturing in Pakistan mentioned earlier. Although AID,
in anticipation of a greatly stepped-up program in fiscal year 1963, had re-
quested a $2,000,000 appropriation for that period, Congress, in view of the
fiscal year 1962 record, simply reapportioned the balance of the $1,500,000
appropriated for fiscal year 1962 (i.e., $1,500,000 less the $1750 obligated by
AID in fiscal year 1962 for the Pakistan paint survey).
Investment Guaranties
Investment guaranties-familiar development tools made more widely avail-
able by the 1961 Act-are basically insurance contracts under which the United
49. See statement by Representative Otto E. Passman (D. La.), Chairman of the
powerful Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings on Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1962 Before the Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 318-19 (1961).
50. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 233(b), 75 Stat. 432 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2193(b)
(Supp. III, 1962).
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States agrees to insure private investors against losses arising from certain
political and, in some cases, business risks. This is potentially one of the most
effective tools for promoting private investment in underdeveloped countries,
but the failure of the foreign aid agencies to administer the program aggressive-
ly has prevented it from realizing its potential.
The use of investment guaranties as a foreign aid tool was originally pro-
posed by a committee of the American Bar Association. 1 The ABA commit-
tee justified the proposal on the ground that stimulation of the flow of private
capital would be less expensive for the U.S. Government than direct govern-
ment-to-government loans. In addition, the committee noted that, if a sufficient
amount of private capital could be, encouraged to move abroad, direct U.S.
Government assistance could be more quickly ended.5 2 As a result of the ABA's
efforts Congress granted 5 3 authority to issue guaranties against the risk of in-
convertibility of currency. 4 This authority was rarely used,55 and so Congress
still intent upon enlisting the aid of private capital, authorized the issuance of
51. See Hearings on United States Assistance to European Econonic Recovery Be-
fore the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, at 1080-1101
(1948) ; Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 80th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. I, at 835-71
(1948) ; Hearings on HR. 2362 Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 631-70 (1949) ; Hearings on; S. 2197 Before the Senate Com-
minttee oft Banking and Currency, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 75-111 (1949).
52. See, e.g., Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery
Program Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 80th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt.
I, at 870 (1948).
53. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, § 111(b) (3), 62 Stat. 144-45 (1948).
54. The ABA's proposal called for much broader guaranty authority than the incon-
vertibility authority granted by Congress. In addition, an integral part of the program pro-
posed by the ABA was the acceptance of a number of obligations by the host country,
including membership in the International Trade Organization. The object of the proposal
was not only to encourage the movement of U.S. capital to Europe, but also to encourage
the rule of law in international financial transactions.
55. The report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the 1949 foreign, aid bill
expressed its disappointment in these words:
These figures fall far short of the expectations of the Congress in originally legis-
lating the convertibility guaranty provision.
H.R. REP. No. 323, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1949). The Committee went on to suggest that
broader coverage was needed and proposed that coverage also be granted for risks of
... seizure, confiscation, or expropriation; destruction by riot, revolution, or war;
any law, ordinance, regulation, decree, or administrative action (other than measures
affecting the conversion of currency), which in the opinion of the Administrator
prevents the further transaction of the business for which the guaranty was issued,
H.R. REP. No. 323, supra at 21. The Senate refused to go along with this expansion, stating:
The committee felt that... broadening the terms of the guaranties would not result
in substantial amounts of increased investments unless the guaranty was made so
broad that, in fact, this Government would assume most of the risks which private
capital should be expected to carry.
S. RsE. No. 100, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1949).
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expropriation insurance in 1950 S and war risk insurance in 1956,"' while re-
questing in no uncertain terms that the agency go forth and use them.ss The
program still faltered, however, and in 1957 a new agency, the Development
Loan Fund (DLF), was authorized to issue guaranties against any type of
loss, except that it could not insure equity investments against normal business
risk.59 This authority was the broadest ever given a foreign aid agency, but a
number of problems, both real and imagined, plus lack of administrative inter-
est, prevented any significant use of it.60
56. Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, § 103(d), 64 Stat. 199 (1950), inserted
the following language in the guaranty statute:
It being the intent of the Congress that the guaranty herein authorized should be
used to the maximum practicable extent and so administered as to increase the par-
ticipation of private enterprise in achieving the purposes of this Act, the Adminis-
trator is authorized to issue guaranties up to a total of $200,000,000.
57. Mutual Security Act of 1956, § 8(k) (3), 70 Stat. 558 (1956).
58. In 1952 the House Foreign Affairs Committee registered its disappointment in
these words:
One of the basic principles which the Congress has emphasized in the statutes
governing the Mutual Security Program is the importance of private-capital invest-
ment as a potent force in raising the economic and social standards of underdeveloped
areas. Not only does private investment bring capital, but it also brings with it
technical knowledge and management experience, so sorely needed. Further, it re-
lieves the American taxpayer, in the long run, of the burden of governmental foreign
aid where cooperative aid can be appropriately handled by private sources. More-
over, private capital offers a natural vehicle for close cooperation between private
citizen and private citizen rather than betveen government and government, and
hence is of special importance. There are several provisions in the law which deal
with this principle .... They were seriously and carefully written by the legislative
branch. It was, and is, intended that they be implemented. The committee is not
satisfied that the Director for Mutual Security has exerted all the reasonable effort
possible to implement those provisions .... The point is that private capital has a
definite place in the program which should be recognized by the executive branch
and our partners in mutual security.
H.I. REP. No. 1922, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1952).
Two years later the House Committee again voiced its criticism of the administration
of the program:
[T]he fact remains that practically nothing has been accomplished in 2 years. Ac-
cordingly, the committee feels it necessary to again emphasize that it is the intention
of Congress, expressed in that provision of the guaranty legislation carried over in
the present bill ... that the guaranty program-"shall be used to the maximum
practicable extent and shall be administered under broad criteria so as to facilitate
and increase the participation of private enterprise in achieving any of the purposes
of this Act."
H.R. RzEP. No. 1925, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 88 (1954). See also H.IL REP. No. 1802,
81st ong., 2d Sess. 42 (1950); H.R. RE. No. 569, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1955).
59. Mutual Security Act of 1957, § 202(b), 71 Stat. 357-58 (1957).
60. While the ICA and DLF authorities were designed to be complementary, they were
in fact competitive because they both operated in the same area, but one was broader than
the other. Not only was DLF's coverage authority broader, but also DLF was not required
to obtain a bilateral agreement with the host country before issuing guaranties, as was
ICA. DLF did not feel that it could issue guaranties in a country with which ICA was
negotiating a bilateral agreement because to do so would have undercut the ICA negotia-
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Accordingly, it must be recognized that the investment guaranty program
so far has achieved only the most limited success. 61 The responsibility for this
disappointing performance of the program can be laid partly on Congress, which
has been very slow to enlarge the coverage to a realistic level, and partly on
the administrators of the aid program, who have usually been more intent upon
protecting the U.S. Treasury than on using private enterprise as a foreign aid
tool. In defense of both Congress and the administrators, however, it must be
noted that it has never been very clear how much or what kind of encourage-
ment an investor must have to make him invest in an underdeveloped country.
Congress when legislating, and the administrators when negotiating guaranty
contracts, appear to have asked themselves, "How little can we give the in-
vestor and still get his help ?" If one assumes that many projects could be built
either with public funds or with Government guaranteed private funds, this
has clearly been a penny wise and pound foolish approach, since it is demon-
strable that private funds, even with the broadest possible Government guar-
anty, are less expensive from the U.S. Government standpoint than are public
funds.62
The investment guaranty authority contained in the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 reflects the reluctance of Congress to give the investor anything more
than is absolutely necessary, 63 and the actions of AID thus far reflect the
tions. Similarly, DLF could not issue a broader guaranty than ICA was authorized to Issue
without encouraging all investors to seek DLF, rather than ICA, guaranties. One might
expect that in such a competitive situation the agency with the broader authority would
issue all the guaranties. It is characteristic of the administration, of the guaranty program,
however, that this was not the case.
61. Only three guaranties aggregating $57.9 million were issued by DLF, and only one
of these covered an equity investment. The ICA authority, because of legislative and ad-
ministrative limitations, has issued only $913 million in guaranty contracts in the more than
thirteen years since the inception of the program. Allowing for double (and triple) count-
ing, since the value of a single investment is counted for each risk covered, this means that
only approximately $600 million in new investment has been covered by guaranties. It the
time it took to issue this amount of guaranties, nearly $50 billion of economic loans and
grants were made, and more than $80 billion of all types of aid were issued. Clearly, the
Investment Guaranty Program has so far been merely a footnote, and a minor one at that,
to the foreign aid program.
62. Assume, for example, that the U.S. borrows money at 4Y% which it relends for
foreign aid at the rate of Y% (the apparent return, to AID on, its loans). The net loss to
the U.S., if all loans are repaid, is 3.tj%. In the case of loans, the U.S. takes not only all
the political risks covered by guaranties, but the business risk as well, because if the bor-
rowing entity fails, the loan is not repaid. In, the case of loans, then, it can be stated that
the U.S. takes all risks incident to repayment for a net loss of 3y/4%. In the case of guar-
anties, on the other hand, the U.S. is not deprived of the use of any funds, but receives a
fee of from 'A% to 2% depending upon the risks assumed. Moreover, in, no case is the risk
assumed under a guaranty as large as the risk assumed under a loan.
63. The Administration proposed an "all risk" guaranty authority to replace the former
broad DLF authority. Administration witnesses indicated, however, that in the normal
case less than 100% of the investment would be insured. Congress responded by limiting
all risk guaranties to 75% of any investment. The Administration indicated that it would
not normally insure against fraud or misconduct for which the investor was responsible
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same cautious approach used in the past. Despite these limitations, however,
the present investment guaranty program offers significant benefits to private
investors and, if private investors are sufficiently ingenious, it can be a very
effective tool.
A threshold question for a lawyer in securing any type of AID financing is
whether his client is eligible. To qualify for an investment guaranty an appli-
cant must be a United States citizen or a corporation, partnership, or other
association created under the laws of the United States or of any state or terri-
tory "and substantially beneficially owned by United States citizens," or a
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of any such corporation." The basic problem
with this language is what constitutes "substantial beneficial ownership."
In considering this, one must at least take into account the two apparent
policy bases of the eligibility requirement: the desire to bring U.S. supervised
or operated enterprise into the less developed countries to provide the benefit
of U.S. technical and managerial know-how, and the desire to ensure that a
majority of the profits from foreign investment assisted by the investment
guaranty and investment survey programs go to the U.S. taxpayers, who pay
for such programs. The latter points toward a requirement of at least majority
U.S. stock ownership. Although such majority stock ownership is not neces-
sarily a guaranty of control in every case, control would follow in the normal
case and it appears likely that AID will adopt this test. Although any test is
somewhat arbitrary, the majority requirement has some rational basis under-
lying it.
In addition, this interpretation is favored by the precedent of a similar inter-
pretation by the International Cooperation Administration of the identical lan-
guage from the investment guaranty provisions of the Mutual Security Act of
1954.65 The only pertinent legislative history of the 1961 act also supports this
position. Originally both the eligibility sections of the investment guaranty and
investment survey titles as proposed by the Administration included as the key
phrase on eligibility the requirement that "the majority beneficial interest is
held by U.S. citizens."66 This was ultimately changed in both places to "sub-
stantially beneficially owned by U.S. citizens." With regard to the change in
section 233(a) relating to investment surveys, the report of the Conference
Committee stated that the change was made by the Committee "in the belief
that [the two phrases] were substantially identical."6' 7 Although the meaning
and, this, too, was put into the statute. In addition, Congress limited each guaranty to $10
million and all such guaranties to $90 million.
64. FAA of 1961, § 221(b), 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b) (Supp. III,
1962). Curiously enough, the special authority of § 224 for guaranties of investments of
pilot demonstration housing projects in Latin America does not extend eligibility for such
guaranties to wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.
65. INTERNATIONAL CooPERATixON ADmINISTRATION, INVESTMENT GUARANTY HAN-
Boox 5 (Rev. ed. 1960). [Hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
66. See §§ 221(b), 223 of S. 1983, introduced in the Senate on May 26, 1961, and §8
221(b), 233 of H.R. 7372, introduced in the House on the same day.
67. CoxF. REP. at 53 (1961).
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of this statement is not wholly clear, it should probably be taken to mean that
Congress preferred the form of statement adopted, but took the substance of
the statement to be the requirement of majority beneficial interest by U.S.
citizens.68
The guaranty program authorized by the FAA of 1961 for eligible corpora-
tions is divided into three parts. The first part is the ICA (specific risk) guaran-
ty against losses arising from inconvertibility, expropriation, and war. Despite
past failures, this is still the backbone of the program, receiving the largest
($1.3 billion) authorization.6 9 The second part is a guaranty against any risk
(including business risk) except fraud or misconduct for which the investor is
responsible,70 a guaranty which was substituted for the previous DLF author-
ity. AID has denominated these guaranties "all risk" guaranties. This was
originally intended to be an experimental program and was to be reserved for
high-priority projects. 1 No project of sufficiently high priority apparently has
presented itself, however, for no such guaranties have been issued, although
this authority has been in existence for a year. In spite of this unimpressive
performance, Congress, in 1962, wisely increased the authorization for this type
of guaranty to $180 million, double the amount authorized in the 1961 act. The
third part, added in 1961, authorizes all risk guaranties for pilot housing pro-
jects in Latin America. 72 This is a limited program ($60 million authorization)
designed to stimulate investment only in such housing. While each of these
sections is designed to stimulate foreign investment, they are essentially dif-
ferent programs with different problems and so will be discussed separately.
Section 221 (b) (1) Specified Risk Gu aranties
Section 221 (b) (1) of the FAA of 1961 authorizes the issuance of guaranties
against the risk of inconvertibility, expropriation and war.73 The first, incon-
vertibility guaranties, are designed to protect American equity and loan in-
vestors in underdeveloped countries against the possibility that the host gov-
ernment will refuse to allow then to exchange local currency for U.S. dollars,
Under these contracts AID agrees to exchange dollars for local currency where
the local government has prohibited transfer or where the transfer can only
be made at a rate less advantageous to the investor than the rate assured by the
guaranty contract. It is important to note that the inconvertibility contract does
not protect the investor against inconvertibility resulting from a law, regulation
68. It should be noted that where the stock of an applicant is wholly or partially owned
by another corporation, such ownership interest must, for purposes of determining eligibility,
be attributed to the stockholders of the parent corporation in proportion to their ownership
interest in the parent, inasmuch as the statute clearly distinguishes between "U.S, citizens"
and "corporations substantially beneficially owned" by such citizens, thus indicating that
the term "citizen' is used in its ordinary reference to natural persons.
69. FAA of 1961, § 221(b) (1), 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b) (1) (Supp,
III, 1962).
70. FAA of 1961, § 221(b) (2), 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b) (2) (Supp,
III, 1962).
71. See 1961 Senate Hearings at 263-64. See note 19 supra.
72. FAA of 1961, § 224, 75 Stat. 432 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2184 (Supp. III, 1962).
73. FAA of 1961, 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b) (Supp. III, 1962).
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or administrative determination in effect on the date of the contract. 4 Pro-
tection extends, in the case of loan investments, to both principal and interest,
and, in the case of equity investments, to tvice the initial investment, except
in special circumstances where more coverage is available.-r
Expropriation guaranties are designed to protect U.S. investors against losses
arising from actions of the host government which manifest expropriatory in-
tent and which, in the case of an equity investment, destroy the value of the
investment as a going concern, or which, in the case of a loan investment, pre-
vent any payment of principal or interest for one year.76 Under these contracts
AID agrees to buy the investor's interest if a covered risk occurs. Here, too,
the coverage for equity investments includes the initial investment plus a limited
amount of reinvested earnings, and coverage for loan investments includes both
principal and interest.77 In the FAA of 1961, Congress made clear that breach
of contract by the host government was intended to be included within the term
"expropriation."7 8 This seemingly unimportant provision offers one of the best
avenues for the investor to expand his coverage without increasing the fee.
74. The standard AID inconvertibility guaranty contract provides that AID will not
be liable under the contract if
the inability of the Investor to effect... transfer... result[s] from the opera-
tion of any law, decree, regulation or administrative determination which is recog-
nized as being in effect by the governing authorities of the project country on the
date of this contract and of which the Investor can reasonably be expected to have
knowledge....
This provision is explained in HAxDBooic 13, as follows:
The convertibility guaranty contract in essence insures that a means, available at
the time the contract is issued, for converting foreign currency investment receipts
into dollars will continue for the life of the contract. Thus the ICA will not guar-
anty convertibility in the face of exchange regulations and practices under which it
would be clear at the time a contract was issued that conversion could be effected
only through the guaranty.
The purpose of this provision is well accomplished- when the foreign exchange law of the
host country is clear. It is not clear what would happen when the law of the host country,
in existence on the date the guaranty was issued, allowed the finance minister to suspend
transfers whenever he felt that the foreign exchange position of the host country required
it. If the finance minister prevented transfer pursuant to such a law, would the investor's
ability to transfer have resulted from "the operation of (a] ... law, ... which is recognized
as being in effect... on the date of the contract?" Probably it would not, but the answer
is by no means certain. A better approach would be for AID to ascertain for itself before
it issues the convertibility guaranty whether the investor will be allowed to repatriate funds.
75. HANDBooK 15.
76. Id. at 17-18.
77. Id. at 18.
78. Section 223(b) provides:
[T]he term "expropriatiore' includes but is not limited, to any abrogation, repudia-
tion, or impairment by a foreign government of its own contract with an investor,
where such abrogation, repudiation, or impairment is not caused by the investor's
own fault or misconduct, and materially adversely affects the continued operation of
the project.
75 Stat. 431 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2183(b) (Supp. III, 1962). This section merely gave
legislative approval to a practice ICA had followed for some time. See, e.g., 1961 House
Hearings at 949-50; 1961 Senate Hearings at 905.
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Under this arrangement an investor may make an agreement with the host
government relating to treatment of the investment. If this contract is breached
by the host government and the effect of the breach is to prevent operation of
the enterprise,79 the investor may collect under his expropriation guaranty.
Theoretically, it would be possible for an ingenious investor to make an agree-
ment covering taxes, labor, power, supplies, prices, transportation and all other
foreseeable adverse actions which the government could take, thereby expand-
ing his coverage well beyond the traditional limits of "expropriation."
The third specific risk guaranty is designed to protect American investors
against loss resulting from war, revolution and insurrection. Under this con-
tract, AID agrees to pay the investor the amount of any physical loss result-
ing from such events.80 Consequential damages, such as loss of profits, result-
ing from cessation of business activity, are not covered.
81
"All Risk" Guaranties
In planning the new AID program in 1961, the foreign aid administrators
noted that there were many possible risks not covered by the specific risk guar-
anties.8 2 These include all the regulatory and revenue producing measures
which may appear reasonable to a young nationalistic government, but which
make it exceedingly difficult for an investor to continue making profits, Other
risks, such as riots and general strikes, which are virtually unknown in the
United States, but which occur frequently in less developed countries, also are
not covered.
Most, if not all, these risks could have been covered under the DLF author-
ity,83 but in the one equity guaranty issued by DLF 8 4 three problems were
encountered:
79. A crucial problem in any expropriation guaranty contract relates to the amount
of injury which the investor must sustain before the action is considered expropriatory, The
ICA contract states that in order to be considered expropriatory the action of the host
government must for a period of one year prevent: (1) the foreign enterprise from exer-
cising substantial control over the use and disposition of its property; or (2) the investor
from effectively exercising its right of participation in the control of the foreign enterprise;
or (3) the investor from disposing of its capital stock in the foreign enterprise or any
rights accruing therefrom. This would seem to include at least the case where the investor
is prevented from operating his business. It is not clear whether lesser amounts of damage
will be sufficient.
80. HANDBOoK 21. Revolution and insurrection have not been included but presumably
will be treated the same as war risk.
81. HANDBOo 21.
82. 1961 Senate Hearings at 906.
83. During the House hearings, Congressman Judd made the following observation:
This is the language in DLF legislation: "No guaranty on equity investment against
normal business-type risk shall be made available by this subsection." By putting it
thus negatively, we opened the door to almost everything else. I realize many never
appreciated that the language provided such an open door. We couldn't get it over
to them. It included guarantee against war risk, revolution, civil strife, and all the
other things you have mentioned-all except business-type risks.
1961 House Hearings at 932. Congressman Judd was as right about the law as he was
wrong about the facts. See note 60 supra.
84. This guaranty covered the investment of Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corpora-
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(1) How should the covered risks be defined?
(2) How can the parties be certain that any particular damage was caused
by a covered risk?
(3) How much injury must the investor suffer before the guaranty is
triggered?
Because of these problems the foreign aid administrators proposed a new guar-
anty authority which they thought would be sufficiently broad to cover the holes
in the specific risk guaranties, but which would avoid at least two of the three
problems cited above.
In the new so-called "all risk" guaranty authority, the AID officials attempted
to invert the variables of the guaranty equation. Thus, instead of insuring
against 100 per cent of loss from certain specified political risks, AID proposed
to insure against 75 per cent of loss from "all risks." sz0 It would thus be un-
necessary to define what risks were covered, and the investor would not have
to establish a causal relationship between a covered risk and the injury.
Unfortunately, failure of the foreign aid agency and Congress to think through
the ramifications of the "all risk" guaranty legislation carefully has resulted in
a statute which does not solve or avoid any of the problems at which it was
directed. First, it was intended that the "all risk" authority would allow AID
to write a guaranty contract in which the covered risks did not have to be de-
fined because "all risks" would be covered. This might have been the case had
Congress not insisted that the contracts not cover "fraud or misconduct for
which the investor is responsible."80 Now, instead of defining what risks are
covered, the contracting parties must define those risks which are not covered,
i.e., fraud and misconduct. Second, it was thought that the "all risk" contract
would avoid the likelihood of lawsuits to determine whether an injury resulted
from a covered risk. Now, instead of proving that the loss arose from a covered
risk, the investor must show that it did not arise from an excluded risk. The
third, and most difficult problem, how much loss the investor must suffer be-
fore he can require AID to buy his investment, is also still with us unless AID
agrees to buy the investor's interest at any time regardless of whether a loss
has occurred.
In spite of the statute's shortcomings, the important question now is what
form the so-called "all risk" guaranty contract should take. A number of possi-
bilities are open to AID and the investor. First, AID could simply make a
tion and Reynolds Metal Company in the Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd., a Ghanaian
corporation (VALCO). Kaiser and Reynolds were insured against, inter alia, the risks of
breach by the Government of Ghana of an agreement to arbitrate disputes; sanctions im-
posed by the United States or international organizations of which the United States is a
member; and war, revolution, riot, political strikes, etc. Pursuant to this guaranty, the
U.S. agreed to buy the interest of the investors if a specified dollar amount of loss (nor-
mally around $5 million) resulted from any of these causes.
85. 1961 House Hearings at 906. In the 1962 amendment AID %%as authorized to in-
sure up to 100% of loan investments in housing projects. FAA of 1962, § 104(a) (2), Pub.
L. 87-565, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 1, 1962).
86. FAA of 1961, § 221(b) (2), 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b) (2) (Supp.
III, 1962).
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standing offer to buy 75 per cent of the investor's interest. Under this arrange-
ment, AID would pay the investor 75 per cent of the original cost of his invest-
ment, plus retained earnings attributable to that portion, less any losses result-
ing from fraud or misconduct of the investor.87 This is the maximum guaranty
that AID could issue under its "all risk" authority.88 But, again, if past experi-
ence is any indication of what will be done in the future, there will probably be
strong pressure from within AID to issue less than the maximum guaranty.
Such "less-than-maximum" guaranties could take any number of forms. For
example, AID could elect to cover only specified risks (presumably more than
war, revolution, insurrection, inconvertibility and expropriation, but less than
"all risk"). Under such an arrangement AID could agree to buy 75 per cent
87. Suppose, for example, that AID guarantees a $1,000,000 loan from a U.S. investor
to a foreign enterprise and that after $600,000 has been repaid the foreign enterprise becomes
insolvent and the investor decides to collect on his guaranty. The calculation of the amount
he would collect could be as follows:
Original guarantied investment $1,000,000
Less: repayments 600,000
Investor's interest outstanding $400,000
Percentage guarantied by AID .75
Amount paid by AID to Investor $300,000
In such a case the investor would recover $900,000 of his original $1,000,000 investment. Of
course, AID would also guaranty payment of interest, but this item has been, omitted for
the sake of clarity in the example.
In the case of equity investments the figures would be somewhat different, but the cal-
culation would take a similar form. Suppose, for example, that a U.S. investor bought a
25% interest in, a foreign enterprise for $1,000,000, and that 50% of this investment was
guarantied by AID under the "all risk" authority. Suppose also that during the first five
years of operation $300,000 of retained earnings attributable to the investor's interest are
accumulated and losses of $100,000 are realized as the result of fraud or misconduct for
which the investor is responsible. In the following year the investor's interest is expro-
priated and he makes a claim under the guaranty. The amount he would collect would be
calculated as follows:
Original guarantied investment $1,000,000
Retained earnings attributable to investor's interest 300,000
Investor's total interest outstanding $1,300,000
Less: Losses from fraud & misconduct 100,000
Portion of investment to which guaranty is applicable $1,200,000
Percentage guarantied by AID .50
Amount paid by AID to Investor $ 600,000
It should be noted that operating losses would not appear as a negative factor in thiR cal-
culation because such losses occur as the result of business risks which are covered under
the "all risk" contract. After the transaction has been completed AID and the investor will
each own 1251% of the stock of the expropriated enterprise or the equivalent in claims
against the expropriating government.
88. Except, of course, for the 100% guaranty of housing loans.
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of the investor's interest for 75 per cent of what he paid for it, if a specified
amount of loss was realized as a result of covered risks.s9 Any number of other
variations are also possible. Whether an investor receives a maximum guaranty
or something less will probably depend upon whether he can convince AID
that his investment is politically important and economically feasible.
Regardless of the type of guaranty the investor receives under section 221
(b) (2), it will be subject to a number of limitations which do not apply to
specific risk guaranties and which did not apply to the predecessor DLF guar-
anties. First, the guaranteed project must "emphasize economic development
projects furthering social progress and the development of small independent
business enterprises." The only guide AID and potential investors have with
respect to the meaning of this remarkable phrase is the following language in
the Senate report:
It must emphasize economic development projects dearly related to social
improvement in the country concerned. The committee, in approving this
authority, expects that it will be used to encourage the development of
small independent business enterprises, credit unions, cooperatives, low-
cost housing projects and other similar activities. 0
Although guaranties of other types of investments are not precluded so long as
sufficient authority is reserved for the preferred categories,"' lack of clarity as
to what other types fall within the statutory intent may cause AID to hesitate
to use the authority outside the "credit union, cooperative and low-cost hous-
ing project" group.
Several other limitations which were not attached to the former DLF au-
thority have also been imposed on the new "all risk" authority. For example,
one loan guaranty under this section may exceed $25 million, and other guar-
anties are limited to $10 million. Since only 75 per cent of each investment
may be covered (except for housing loans), however, loan investments up to
$33Y3 million and other investments up to $133 million may be insured. Also,
for investments in excess of that amount there appears to be no legal reason
why specific risk guaranties cannot be obtained on the excess. Thus, an arrange-
ment conceivably could be made whereby the first $13 million of a $50 million
equity investment could be covered by an "all risk" guaranty, and the last $37
million covered by specific risk guaranties.
Not only is the amount of the guaranty limited, but so is the geographic area
in which it may be issued. Pursuant to section 221 (a) "all risk" guaranties
may now be issued only in countries with which the President has agreed to
institute the guaranty program. In the past this limitation had attached only
to the ICA specific risk guaranty authority and was construed to require a de-
89. The most time consuming part of drafting the VALCO guaranty was the job of
determining what constituted a loss: only physical loss? debts accrued but not paid? lost
profits? Another vexing problem was the time period over which the losses could be ac-
cumulated.
90. S. REP. No. 612, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1961).
91. CONF. REP. at 52 (1961).
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tailed agreement with the host country for each type of guaranty.0 2 By June 1,
1962, only 21 countries had signed agreements authorizing all three specific
risk guaranties;93 17 others had signed expropriation and inconvertibility
agreements ;94 three had signed only convertibility agreements ;05 and 38 had
signed no agreements at all. 06 If all three agreements are to be required for
"all risk" guaranties, the possibilities for use of the authority in the near future
will be substantially reduced.
The foreign aid officials who drafted the FAA of 1961 recognized the diffi-
culties created by the agreement requirement.97 Accordingly, the new statute
contains two provisions relating to such agreements. The first merely requires
the President to obtain an agreement to institute the program before issuing
guaranties for projects in any given country.98 The second provision requires
the President to make suitable arrangements for the protection of American
interests. 99
92. See the draft note of the Investment Guaranties Staff, Agency for International
Development, which may be used to institute the investment guaranty program (covering
convertibility, expropriation and war risk guaranties) ; and Tidd, The Investinent Gilarantv
Programt and the Problem of Expropriation, 26 GEO. WASH. L. RV. 710 (1958).
93. INVESTMENT GUARANTIES DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRA-
TION, COUNTRIES WHERE INVESTMENT GUARANTIES ARE AVAILADLE (1962). These are
Afghanistan, China (Taiwan), Dominican Republic, Guinea, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan,
Korea, Liberia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Sierre Leone, Sudan,
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, and Viet-Nam.
94. These are Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Hon-
duras, India, Iran, Malaya, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugo-
slavia.
95. Argentina, Chile, and Peru.
96. Baharian, Burma, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ceylon,
Chad, Colombia, Congo (Leopoldville), Congo Republic (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Dahomey,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mala-
gasy, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Muscat and Oman, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somali
Republic, Syria, Togo, Truceal Sheikdoms and Quatar, Upper Volta, Venezuela, and
Yemen.
97. The House Foreign Affairs Committee explained the problem as follows:
In past years these requirements have led to difficulties and delays in reaching
agreements needed to begin the program. Many foreign governments require such
agreements to be ratified by their legislatures. This sometimes occasions delays of
many months and years even though there may be little doubt as to its eventual
approval. Another major problem area is that many countries, because of contitu-
tional or statutory provisions barring ownership of real property by a foreign gov-
ernment, cannot commit themselves to recognize turnover of such property to the
United States.
House Foreign Affairs Committee Report on H.R. 8400, H.R. REP. No. 851, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 36 (1961).
98. FAA of 1961, § 221(2), 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (Supp. III,
1962). See H.R. RP,. No. 851, supra note 97, at 32; 1961 Senate Hearings at 264-65; 1961
House Hearings at 948.
99. FAA of 1961, § 221(d), 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(d) (Supp. 111, 1962).
See 1961 House Hearings at 907-08, 921, 951-52; 1961 Senate Hearings at 264-65, 275, 282;
H.R. REP. No. 851, supra note 97, at 36-37.
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AID officials took the position that the first requirement could be satisfied
by any manifestation by the host country that it was willing to use the guar-
anty program to induce American investors to invest within its boundaries.100
Since the second provision requires the President to make "suitable arrange-
ments" for protection of American interests but does not require that these
arrangements take any particular form,101 both provisions would be satisfied if
a detailed agreement can be obtained. Where a detailed agreement cannot be
obtained, other arrangements can be made to protect American interests.10*-'
Such arrangements could take the form of a lesser agreement, a finding that
there are reasonable prospects of obtaining such an agreement in the near
future, or a finding that American interests will be adequately protected with-
out an agreement. 0 3
If past practices of the foreign aid agencies are followed, however, the flexi-
bility allowed by the new statute may be negated in large part by the legisla-
tive history of the provision,1 4 since the agencies tend to rely heavily upon such
history in evaluating courses of action. The Administration witness on guar-
anties, the Hon. Frank M. Coffin, may thus have preordained an inflexible
approach when he stated that in all cases concerted efforts would be made to
obtain agreements substantially similar to those obtained in the past. Perhaps
this viewpoint rests upon a fear of opening the floodgates-that if a lesser
agreement should ever be accepted from one country, it will be exceedingly
100. 1961 Senate Hearings at 279.
101. FAA of 1961, § 221(d), 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(d) (Supp. III,
1962). See 1961 Senate Hearings at 282; 1961 House Hearings at 951-52; H.R. REP. No.
851, .slpra note 97, at 36-37.
102. The Administration's intentions in this regard were described as follows:
It is intended to continue to seek to conclude agreements which contain explicit
recognition of the U.S. Government's right to subrogation, and turnover of assets.
However, this new provision will allow alternative arrangements suited to the par-
ticular circumstances of the case where legal obstacles in less-developed countries
inhibit their entry into standard form bilateral agreements.
H.R. REP. No. 851, supra note 97, at 36-37.
103. See 1961 Senate Hearings at 264-65.
104. See, e.g., 1961 House Hearings at 264-65. It is important to note here the great
concern AID and its predecessor agencies have had about their congressional relations and
the peculiar effect this concern has upon the opinions of the General Counsel's office and,
ultimately, upon the operations of the agency. The actions of AID will be challenged, if at
all, not in a court but in congressional hearings. Accordingly, when an AID lawyer is asked
for an opinion on the legality of a proposed action, he does not only ask himself how a court
would decide the case but also, and more importantly, how Congress vill react to it. The
best guide to the reaction of Congress is the legislative history, and accordingly great weight
is given, to it. Of peculiar significance is the view agency officials take of Administration
testimony before Congress. Such testimony, no matter how ill prepared or speculative it
might have been, may be regarded by the agency as a commitment to Congress. The effect
such testimony has on future agency action, will be determined by whether it is vague and
general or specific and certain, and, also, by how important the agency regards the pro-
posed action to be. This view of congressional testimony does not appear to be significantly
affected by how mistaken, the witnesses may turn out to be or evert whether Congress in
any way relied upon the statements in question.
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difficult for the agency to obtain the standard agreement from any other coun-
try. Whatever the reason, AID very well may be reluctant to bargain seriously
for anything but the standard agreement, thereby rendering its flexibility mean-
ingless.105 In this connection, it may be significant that, as of this writing, the
lack of such an agreement is preventing the issuance of guaranties in such im-
portant countries as Brazil, and, so far, no "increased flexibility" has been
shown by AID.
An avenue that may be available to a potential investor planning a project
in a country with which the United States has not executed an agreement is to
attempt to persuade the host government to enter into an agreement with the
United States containing all the standard provisions, but covering only his in-
vestment. °6 Instead of having to follow the standard practices and procedures
with respect to many unknown future projects, the host government might
hiore readily agree to such practices and procedures only with respect to the
particular investment before it.
Housing Guaranties
Section 224 107 authorizes the issuance of "all risk" guaranties up to a face
amount of $60 million for investments in "self-liquidating pilot housing pro-
jects" in Latin America. Since the coverage allowed under this section is basi-
cally the same as that allowed under section 221 (b) (2),108 the "all risk" au-
thority (which authorizes guaranties of 100 per cent of loan investments in
105. See the discussion. of this point in the Report on H.R. 11921 [The Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1962] of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H.R. REi. No. 1788, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11 (1962).
106. This approach was suggested in 1953 by the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
but was never adopted by the agency. The Committee said:
Insistence by the executive branch on, initiating the program in new countries through
formal international agreements (not required by guaranty legislation) has been a
stumbling block in some countries. It has been stated that the potentialitieg of the
guaranty program can be defeated by this lack of flexibility, and that the best way
to get started in the politically sensitive countries is with formal assurances appli-
cable to specific cases and not necessarily formalized international agreements. As-
surances from foreign governments should be kept to a minimum, and used primarily
to deter voluntary adverse actions by foreign governments.
SUBCOMMrITEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE HoUsE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE,
REPORT ON THE MUTUAL SEcuRITY ACT AND OVERSEAS PPIVATE INVESTMENT 72-73 (1953).
In addition to this approach, it may be possible to get AID to accept a higher than
normal fee from the investor in lieu of an agreement with the host country. Section 221 (d)
merely requires AID to make "suitable arrangements for protecting the interests of the
United States Government." If the interests to be protected are merely the financial in-
terests of the U.S. their a higher fee would seem to constitute "suitable arrangements."
If on the other hand, AID construes the "interests" referred to in § 221(d) as including
not only financial interests but also the U.S. interest in persuading other countries to agree
to its views regarding the legal rights of foreign investments, then such an arrangement
would not be "suitable."
107. 75 Stat. 432 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2184 (Supp. III, 1962), as amended by Pub. L.
87-565, pt. 1, § 104(c) (1962).
108. 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b) (2) (Supp. III, 1962).
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housing projects), it has the same problems relating to coverage, e.g., the diffi-
culty of proving that a given loss did not arise from an excluded risk, and
the like. There is, however, one limitation on the issuance of all other guaran-
ties-the bilateral agreement-which does not apply to section 224 guaranties.
For some unknown reason, perhaps related to the fact that the housing guar-
anty section was not a part of the original bill, but was added as an amend-
ment,109 the requirement that the President issue guaranties in countries "with
the government of which the President has agreed to institute the program"
and that he make "suitable arrangements" to protect the interests of the United
States, does not apply to section 224.110
Conversely, however, there are a number of qualifications which have been
imposed upon the housing guaranty section which were not imposed upon the
others. Housing guaranties are available only in the "American Republics," but
are not confined to the "less developed friendly countries and areas" in Latin
America. Instead, such guaranties can be issued in any "rapidly developing"
Latin American country. Does this mean that section 224 housing guaranties
are not available in "less developed countries"? Are the terms "less developed"
and "rapidly developing" mutually exclusive? The legislative history is devoid
of any indication of congressional intention, and AID has not issued a formal
interpretation. Probably, however, AID will determine that the terms are not
mutually exclusive and will issue section 224 guaranties anywhere in Latin
America. Realistically, it should not be otherwise. The difference in language
probably was not intentional and should not be regarded as legally significant.
Second, section 224 guaranties are not available to cover the investments of
wholly owned subsidiaries of American firms as section 221 guaranties are.
Rather, section 224 guaranties are confined to
... investments made by United States citizens, or corporations, partner-
ships, or other associations created under the law of the United States or
of any State or territory and substantially beneficially owned by United
States citizens .... 111
Here, again, the reason for the difference between section 224 and section 221
is not to be found in the legislative history.
109. It was proposed by Senator George Smathers of Florida. 107 CoNc. Rzc. 16015-17
(1961).
110. 75 Stat. 432 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2184 (Supp. III, 1962). In the FAA of 1961,
both § 221(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(a), which imposes the country agreement requirement,
and § 221(d), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(d), which imposes the suitable arrangements requirement,
refer explicitly to guaranties under § 221(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b), without mention of
§ 224, 22 U.S.C. § 2184; and § 224 itself includes no reference to the requirements of
§ 221(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(a), or § 221(c), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(c). The argument is
strengthened by the fact that § 224(c), 22 U.S.C. § 2184(c), does provide that the adminis-
trative provisions of §§ 222(a) (b) (d) & (e), 22 U.S.C. §§ 2182(a) (b) (d) & (e), shall
apply equally to § 224 guaranties as they do to § 221(b) (2), 22 U.S.C. § 2181(b) (2)
guaranties.
111. FAA of 1961, § 224(b), 75 Stat. 432 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2184(b) (Supp. III,
1962).
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Investments guarantied under section 224 must be in "self-liquidating private
housing projects" of types similar to those insured by the Federal Housing
Administration and suitable for conditions in Latin America. The legislative
history does not indicate what a "self-liquidating private housing project" is,
but this will probably be interpreted to mean those housing projects in which
the homes are sold to the people living in them.
Finally, under section 224 the United States participates with the host coun-
try in guarantying private American capital. Does this mean that the United
States and the host country must each guaranty a certain percentage of an
investment? Probably it does not; rather, any form of host government par-
ticipation in the project should suffice. Thus, the host government could supply
the land or set up financing facilities. The idea of "participation" would seem
to be satisfied so long as the host government, the United States, and the pri-
vate investor cooperate in putting housing into the hands of the people.
Conclusion
It was noted in the introduction to this article that there is a significant role
which private American foreign investment could play in the foreign aid pro-
gram, but that so far it has not done so. In response to the potential investor's
argument that sufficient inducement has not yet been offered, AID officials have
frequently taken the position that the investment climate in the underdeveloped
countries is so bad that no amount of inducement is likely to excite the interest
of investors. In the extreme, this argument fails, since, with the proper legis-
lation, it would be possible to guarantee circumstances, such as high annual
yield, under which even the most conservative investor could be induced to
undertake investment. Thus, if the United States Government feels that private
enterprise participation is sufficiently important, it can probably obtain far
greater participation merely by increasing the inducements offered; the United
States Government does have the potential means to obtain as much private
enterprise participation as it wishes.
Since there is at present an obviously insufficient private enterprise par-
ticipation in the program, the remedy appears to be to increase the inducements
offered. Some expansion of private participation can be accomplished through
the administrative actions suggested in this article. If a large increase in private
participation is desired, however, Congress will have to provide more liberal
inducement. In this connection the amounts authorized for "all risk" guar-
anties, "housing" guaranties, and investment surveys could be increased. In
addition, the requirement of a bilateral agreement for investment guaranties
could well be eliminated, and the vague and troublesome language of the "all
risk" and "housing" guaranty legislation could be improved, or completely
replaced, by much simpler language modeled after the old DLF authority.
No amount of legislative or administrative change is likely to produce results,
however, unless the agency personnel can be induced to make use of the avail-
able tools; the overriding problem at the moment is this reluctance of AID
and the State Department to use existing inducements for private investment.
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Moreover, this reluctance has produced an observable negative effect. For ex-
ample, there appears to be some evidence that the so far unused AID "all risk"
guaranty authority has in fact retarded, rather than increased, private Ameri-
can investment in underdeveloped areas. This rather curious result appears to
have occurred because lenders who were beginning to consider the possibility
of making commercial loans in underdeveloped areas have held back in order
to see whether their proposed investments could be covered by an "all risk"
guaranty. Of course, they dare not make the investment without such a guar-
anty if AID would give it, because AID would then conclude that for that type
of investment it is not necessary, and therefore would not offer it in the future.
It is not clear that this "wait and see" attitude has developed in cases other
than that of the "all risk" guaranty, but this one experience should be sufficient
to indicate that AID should either use its private enterprise authority or sug-
gest its repeal.
If the private enterprise-foreign aid program cannot go forward with the
support, or at least the acquiescence, of AID and State Department personnel,
it might be well to examine and try to meet their objections to the use of pri-
vate American investment. It was noted in the introduction to this article that
at times these officials have objected to private investment by American firms
in underdeveloped countries because there appeared to be some doubt whether
such investment would further the foreign policy interests of the United States.
It is clear, however, that many American firms have succeeded in making their
operations acceptable to foreign governments, by insuring that their citizens
share the benefits of economic development.
The methods used by American firms to distribute the benefits of develop-
ment to the local citizens vary with the country and with the investor. In gen-
eral, however, tao principal approaches seem to be emerging. The first ap-
proach, exemplified by Kaiser Industries in Argentina, Brazil and India, is to
ensure that a large proportion of its stock (priced in very small denominations)
is bought by local middle class investors.' Thus, the local as well as American
investors profit from the growth of the enterprise and it becomes the interest
of local investors to see that American enterprise is not unduly hampered by
actions of the host government. The second approach, used by Firestone Rubber
Company in Liberia and by Creole Petroleum Company in Venezuela, is to
provide communities with services previously unavailable to them. For example,
Creole Petroleum operates many schools, hospitals and stores on a non-profit
basis, in addition to supplying housing and recreational facilities for its em-
ployees. As the community develops, control of these facilities is transferred to
local private or public groups, while Creole continues to supply financial sup-
port.113 The result is not only to create some measure of community dependence
112. Opportunik Unlimitcd, address by Henry J. Kaiser, Jr., Executive Club of Chi-
cago, April 29, 1960.
113. TAYLOR & LINDEMAN, U-IMED STATES Business PRFoRnmC A~noAD 38-57
(1955). (This is the fourth case study in a National Planning Association series on United
States business abroad.)
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on the company, but also to generate a considerable reservoir of good will.
Which of these approaches works best depends upon the country involved, but
both approaches have had the effect of distributing the benefits of economic
development throughout a large segment of the economy, and thus of creating
broadly based support for the private investor.
In areas where nationalistic feelings are running very high, much of the
potential criticism of foreign private investment can be met in advance by a
joint ownership arrangement, in which the American firm takes a minority
position, if the eligibility sections can be interpreted to permit this~1 4 Such a
company is less likely to be considered a "foreign firm" by the local citizens
because majority control is in the hands of their own nationals. Accordingly,
there is much less likelihood of harassment or expropriation by the local gov-
ernment, while the American firm's knowledge and experience can still be
brought to bear on the problems.
Since these measures go far toward insuring that private American invest-
ment abroad also serves the foreign policy interests of the United States, it
would seem that a method should be found for imposing such obligations on
all American investors who operate abroad with the financial assistance of the
United States Government. In fact, it is possible to make such obligations part
of the contract between the United States and the American investors, pur-
suant to which AID makes financing available. AID has begun to recognize
the benefits of such a program, and has already required some investors to
support local clinics and contribute to social development funds in return for
AID assistance to their project. In one case an American investor, whose enter-
prise was to be established in a politically sensitive area, was required to set up
an elaborate selection and training program on a Peace Corps model for those
of its employees who would be sent to the host country. Personality factors as
well as technical abilities were to be considered in making the selection. Per-
sons who might find it difficult to adapt to relatively primitive surroundings
were to be weeded out. Those selected were to be given intensive short term
training by specialists in local customs. Where necessary, longer term language
courses were to be given.
Continuing to impose such obligations on AID assisted investors on a broader
basis should go far toward removing the legitimate objections of State Depart-
ment and AID personnel-as well as those of the foreign governments them-
selves-to the use of private American investment in the foreign aid program.
But there is a possibility that other objections, stemming from a bureaucratic
preference for government-to-government operations will remain. Such objec-
tions can, of course, be overcome by determined administrative action. But if
such action is not forthcoming, it may be necessary for Congress-if it wishes
more private participation-to enact legislation requiring a specified amount
of all foreign aid funds to be used for private projects.
114. See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
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